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Softening	a	hard	border:	lessons	from	North
America	for	post-Brexit	Ireland
There	are	ample	lessons	from	the	Canada-US	border	for	post-Brexit	Ireland,
write	Laurie	Tannous	(University	of	Windsor)	and	Katy	Hayward	(Queen’s
University	Belfast).	For	example,	a	‘hard’	border	need	not	mean	the	end	of	economic
integration	of	Ireland.	Yet	building	a	smooth	functioning	border	is	a	comprehensive
undertaking,	and	some	friction	will	be	inevitable.
On	a	recent	visit	to	the	United	States	and	Canada,	Irish	Taoiseach	(Prime	Minister)
Leo	Varadkar	took	the	opportunity	to	witness	firsthand	the	operation	of	border	controls	between	the	two	states,	at
Queenstown-Lewistown.
Just	visited	Canada-US	border.	It's	high	tech	and	highly	efficient,	but	make	no	mistake	–	it's	a	hard
border.	pic.twitter.com/VUVwtLyuGA
—	Leo	Varadkar	(@campaignforleo)	August	22,	2017
Varadkar’s	comments	have	been	seen	as	goading	the	UK	government,	which	claims	to	be	able	to	achieve	a	‘hard
Brexit’	without	risking	a	‘hard	border’	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	on	the	island	of	Ireland.	British	politicians	have
assured	voters	that	the	Irish	border	will	remain	‘seamless	and	frictionless’	even	as	the	UK	exits	the	very
arrangements	(i.e.	the	EU’s	Single	Market	and	Customs	Union)	that	have	facilitated	such	close	cross-border
integration	to	date.
In	so	doing,	many	have	pointed	to	the	Canada-US	border	experience	as	providing	evidence	that	it	is	possible	to
have	a	hard	border	(albeit	within	a	Free	Trade	Agreement)	that	does	not	severely	suppress	the	movement	of
people	and	goods.	Canada	and	the	US	enjoy	a	very	high	level	of	economic	integration	despite	all	goods	and
people	crossing	the	border	having	to	be	cleared	by	a	border	customs	officer.	However,	smooth	control	of	a	hard
border	is	contingent	upon	sufficient	flexibility	and	deep	cooperation	on	both	sides,	and	it	is	not	without	its
frictions.	
Reducing	the	friction	of	a	hard	border
The	EU	can	have	comparatively	‘frictionless’	internal	borders	because	all	its	members	subscribe	to	the	same
rules,	standards	and	principles	to	allow	Freedom	of	Movement	of	people,	goods,	services	and	capital.
Membership	of	the	European	Union	means	that	the	UK	currently	shapes	and	shares	these	rules,	standards	and
principles.	To	leave	the	EU	immediately	poses	obstacles	to	free	movement,	thus	requiring	border	controls	to
ensure	different	rules	are	enforced	on	either	side.
A	hard	border	enables	Canada	and	the	US	to	maintain	policy	and	legislative	independence	on	matters	of
significant	national	difference,	such	as	on	the	availability	of	handguns	or	on	refugee	policy.	There	is,	thus,	plenty
of	‘friction’	on	the	Canada-US	border,	and	much	of	this	is	by	choice.	Yet	it	is	a	border	that	is	easier	to	cross	and
clears	far	more	trade	than	most	international	borders.	This	is	because	–	despite	differences	in	attitudes	towards
border	policy	–	both	governments	share	a	deep	understanding	of	how	border	operations	impact	their	economies
and	are	thus	engaged	in	ongoing	efforts	to	keep	border	frictions	down	to	manageable	levels.
Canada	and	the	US	have	had	a	series	of	agreements	on	cooperative	border	operations	that	are	quite	separate
from	NAFTA,	the	most	recent	being	the	Beyond	the	Border	Action	Plan	agreed	in	late	2011.	At	the	same	time,
both	countries	participate	in	a	Regulatory	Cooperation	Council	aimed	at	eliminating	differences	in	regulation	that
impede	trade.	A	similar	process	of	consultation	will	be	needed	to	soften	the	hard	border	across	Ireland	–	one	that
will	have	to	be	accommodated	by	the	negotiated	outcome	from	the	Brexit	process	and	any	final	deal.
From	trade	deals	to	implementation
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Although	they	may	define	the	rules	of	cross-border	trade,	trade	deals	alone	will	not	ensure	a	smoothly	functioning
border	because	they	don’t	dictate	how	the	rules	will	be	implemented.	The	complexity	(and	bureaucracy)	of	the	EU
reflects	its	quest	to	cover	the	mechanisms	for	implementing	rules	as	well	as	the	creation	of	those	rules
themselves.	This	is	particularly	clear	in	the	field	of	agri-food,	with	its	particular	vulnerability	to	costs	and	delays
caused	by	border	controls.
The	biggest	challenge	for	cross-border	agri-food	is	in	food	safety	regulations.	Inconsistency	here	can	lead	to
multiple	inspections	and	food	spoiling	in	the	truck	as	it	waits	for	an	official	from	the	right	ministry	to	arrive.
Through	the	Beyond	the	Border	process,	the	Regulatory	Cooperation	Council	and	recent	legislation	in	both
countries,	Canada	and	the	US	are	slowly	making	progress	on	food	standard	harmonization.	So,	across	the	‘hard’
border,	it	is	not	unusual	for	pigs	to	cross	the	border	more	than	once	en	route	to	being	bacon	for	consumption	in
either	country.
across	the	‘hard’	border,	it	is	not	unusual	for	pigs	to	cross	the	border	more	than
once	en	route	to	being	bacon	for	consumption	in	either	country
There	are	currently	highly	integrated	agri-food	supply	chains	on	the	island	of	Ireland.	A	reasonable	fear	is	that
things	will	go	in	the	opposite	direction	in	the	post-Brexit	environment,	given	the	ambition	to	disentangle	the	UK
from	EU	laws	and	the	temptation	for	the	UK	to	go	its	own	way	on	food	regulation	(particularly	if	it	seeks	trade
deals	with	new	countries).	Yet	any	divergence	in	regulation	makes	a	border	more	difficult	to	administer	and	less
efficient.
Image:CC0
Creative	Commons
Flexibility	from	the	EU	could	allow	an	all-island	of	Ireland	action	plan	on	post-Brexit	agri-food	(as	envisaged	in	the
UK	Government	Position	paper	on	Northern	Ireland/Ireland)	in	order	to	help	preserve	jobs	and	competitiveness	in
this	key	industry	on	the	island.	There	are	already	some	bodies	(such	as	the	all-island	organization	safefood)	that
could	be	developed	in	such	a	way	as	to	help	ensure	consistency	in	regulations	and	standards	in	this	area.	In
some	sense,	however,	this	would	constitute	a	huge	amount	of	effort	and	investment	simply	to	stand	still.
Labour	mobility
The	greatest	challenge	in	facilitating	movement	of	goods	across	a	border	is	dealing	with	the	movement	of	people
across	the	border	that	it	necessarily	entails	(this	is	one	reason	why	the	EU	has	the	movement	of	people	as	an
integral	part	of	the	Single	Market).	Trade	requires	cross-border	trips	for	marketing,	negotiations,	etc.	For	more
complex	goods,	such	as	machinery,	this	need	expands,	as	skilled	people	must	be	dispatched	to	customers’
locations	for	maintenance,	repair	and	training.
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The	Canada-US	example	points	to	potential	future	difficulties	for	the	UK-EU	relationship.	NAFTA	permits	limited
cross-border	commuting	for	people	in	a	few	high-skilled	occupations	and	can	enable	‘fast-track’	border	crossings
for	such	individuals.	However,	an	outdated	list	of	skilled	occupations	makes	this	programme	increasingly
irrelevant.	Furthermore,	under	NAFTA,	limitations	on	the	movement	of	labour	are	enforced	according	to	the
individual	discretion	of	border	officials,	leading	to	great	uncertainty	and	frequent	refusals	of	legitimate	trips.
The	lesson	here	is	that,	first,	restricting	mobility	of	people	will	come	at	a	cost	to	trade.	Secondly,	moving	from	free
to	limited	labour	mobility	will	require	regulations	that	are	clear,	consistently	enforced	and	regularly	updated.	Any
future	Brexit-related	enhancement	of	the	UK-Ireland	Common	Travel	Area	will	have	to	take	this	into
consideration.
Technology
Another	lesson	from	the	Canada-US	example	is	in	the	realm	of	technology.	The	UK	government	has	consistently
claimed	that	there	are	technological	solutions	to	the	challenges	of	the	post-Brexit	Irish	border.	Although
technology	can	only	be	a	tool	of	border	control	rather	than	its	substitute,	it	is	true	that	systems	that	provide
advanced	knowledge	of	incoming	shipments	can	reduce	inefficiency.	Again,	however,	inadequacies	in
implementation	can	have	a	devastating	effect	on	trade.
As	part	of	the	Beyond	the	Border	Action	Plan,	Canada	and	the	US	agreed	to	create	single	window	portals	for
faster	and	more	efficient	processing	of	customs	data	and	documentation.		At	the	present	time,	failures	of	the
software	during	its	implementation	phase	have	led	to	a	number	of	major	delays	at	the	largest	border	crossings.
This	initiative	could	be	used	as	a	model,	but	the	costs	of	implementation	–	and	the	time	needed	to	eradicate
errors	and	technical	hiccups	–	should	not	be	underestimated.
Conclusion
The	Canada-US	example	proves	that	a	‘hard’	border	need	not	mean	the	end	of	economic	integration	on	the
island	of	Ireland.	Yet	building	a	smooth	functioning	border	is	a	significant	undertaking	that	will	take	time,
preparation	and	resources.	At	best,	however,	such	arrangements	can	only	provide	means	of	managing	the
effects	of	border	friction	that	will	inevitably	be	sparked	by	the	very	process	of	Brexit.
The	Canada-US	example	proves	that	a	‘hard’	border	need	not	mean	the	end	of
economic	integration	on	the	island	of	Ireland.
Perhaps	more	importantly,	the	Canada-US	example	is	testament	to	the	fact	that	casting	off	the	shackles	of	EU
membership	will	not	enable	the	UK	to	escape	from	the	mechanisms	that	best	ensure	‘frictionless’	trade:	deep
cooperation,	ongoing	engagement,	common	regulation,	harmonization,	coordinated	investment,	and	compromise.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
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Dr	Katy	Hayward	is	Reader	in	Sociology	&	Senior	Research	Fellow,	Senator	George	J.	Mitchell	Institute	for
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